Request for Applications: Countering North Korean and Iranian WMD, Missile, and UAS Proliferation

Deadline: 31-Jan-24

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (ISN/CTR) is pleased to announce an open competition for assistance awards through this funding opportunity focuses on mitigating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and WMD-related delivery systems proliferation and security threats from non-state actors and proliferator states.

ISN/CTR sponsors foreign assistance activities funded by the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) and other accounts. An underlying aim of all ISN/CTR’s efforts is long-term sustainability to maximize programmatic impact while minimizing the need for foreign partners to rely on outside financial or technical assistance.

While the United States continues to seek negotiations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to reach the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it maintains the policy that international pressure and sanctions must remain in force until the DPRK fully denuclearizes. ISN/CTR supports the pressure campaign against the DPRK by training partners to implement United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) constraining the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, to detect and halt DPRK-linked sanctions evasion activities, and to impede the DPRK’s material and financial activities that fund the development of WMD and related delivery systems. ISN/CTR achieves this mission through capacity-building programs, open-source research, and other specialized efforts, all of which help at-risk countries detect and shut down financial and material flows to the DPRK. This NOFO solicits proposals aimed at curtailing DPRK revenue generation activities, restricting the flow of refined petroleum to the DPRK to remain under the annual UNSCR-mandated cap, and improving broader implementation on DPRK sectoral sanctions.

Iran continues to develop and produce ballistic missiles (BMs) that directly threaten the United States, the partners and allies, and enable its destabilizing activities in the region. Iran continues to supply advanced unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to Russia in support of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, and supplies versions of those UAS to its regional proxies. Both programs rely on materials and technologies produced outside Iran. Iran’s procurements include components that are not covered by international trade controls, and they require both the movement of physical goods into Iran and transactions through foreign financial institutions. This NOFO solicits proposals specifically aimed at countering the development of, and the advancements in, Iran’s ballistic missile and UAS programs by disrupting Iranian acquisition of proliferation sensitive technologies, materials, and expertise, and at improving international adherence to relevant U.S. and other sanctions.

Objectives

• As part of the U.S. government’s effort to use all available tools to ensure maximum compliance with international sanctions on the DPRK and Iran, ISN/CTR trains key public and private stakeholders to understand their obligations and take measures to fully implement relevant sanctions on those states. ISN/CTR does not support activities related to the training, engagement, or redirection of DPRK or Iranian nationals or government or non-government agencies in those two countries.

Project Proposals

ISN/CTR seeks proposals that address the following DPRK and Iranian sanctions evasion activities:

• Cybersecurity
  • The DPRK conducts cyber operations against virtual asset entities (VAEs), banks, and other vulnerable institutions to generate revenue for its WMD program: The DPRK generates substantial revenue for its WMD programs through widespread and increasingly sophisticated cyber operations against vulnerable institutions worldwide. DPRK cyber actors have committed dozens of cyber-enabled thefts targeting cryptocurrency exchanges, decentralized financial applications, and other VAEs such as blockchain-based games and casinos operating in dozens of countries across all State Department regions. Ransomware is increasingly leveraged by DPRK cyber actors to extort vulnerable organizations, including hospitals and critical infrastructure, for cryptocurrency payments. ISN/CTR seeks proposals that engage VAEs, private financial institutions (FIs), and other industries vulnerable to DPRK cyber operations to reduce the risk of DPRK cyber-enabled thefts.
• Counter-Proliferation Finance
  • The DPRK and Iran use networks of shell companies and foreign representatives to launder money through foreign banks and, in the case of the DPRK, cryptocurrency exchanges, to fund their sanctioned weapons programs: ISN/CTR seeks proposals that will enhance the abilities of partner governments and the private sector to identify, report, and disrupt DPRK or Iranian proliferation finance activities.
• Maritime Sanctions Implementation
  • The DPRK exploits ship registries to evade UN sanctions on maritime commerce and to generate revenue for the development of WMD: DPRK-linked entities, including trading partners, evade sanctions by using falsified documents to register vessels, disabling ships’ identification/location transponders to conduct dark voyages, registry-hopping to evade enforcement action, and exploiting the sometimes-relaxed documentary requirements for “provisional” registration of commercial vessels. Registries with lax enforcement mechanisms fail to identify, deregister, and report DPRK-linked vessels. ISN/CTR seeks proposals that enhance the ability and motivation of ship registries to detect and halt DPRK sanctions evasion.
  • The DPRK uses ship-to-ship transfers to export coal and import refined petroleum in violation of UN sanctions: Despite robust UNSCR and U.S. sanctions, the DPRK continues to conduct illicit ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum and coal, including by obfuscating its connection to this activity with the various commercial stakeholders involved in the supply chain. ISN/CTR seeks proposals that enable, motivate, and incentivize global commodity trading, supplier, and brokering companies, financial institutions, insurers, shipping industry associations, ship owners, operators, and charterers, shipyard owners, port managers, classification societies, vessel captains and crewing companies, and other commercial stakeholders to proactively identify and report clients that facilitate potential DPRK-linked ship-to-ship transfers.
• Proliferation-Sensitive Transfers
  • Transfer of Ballistic Missile and UAS-Related Technology and Materials: Iran seeks to import proliferation-sensitive, dual-use technologies and certain high-quality raw materials, with the goal of indigenizing its ballistic missile production and producing UAS. The DPRK is also, to an extent, reliant on foreign sources of commodities and technology for its WMD and ballistic missile programs. Both countries rely on trusted procurement agents and networks to obfuscate their procurement activities.
• DPRK Sectoral Sanctions
  • DPRK overseas laborers generate revenue which is used to develop WMD and missile systems in violation of UNSCRs: DPRK laborers continue to work outside the country for its exclusive financial benefit despite the obligation of all UN Member States to repatriate them in compliance with UNSCR 2397 (2017). Information technology, building and public arts construction, and putative medical services are the highest-earning and most common fields in which tens of thousands of DPRK nationals work. ISN/CTR seeks proposals for engaging government bodies, prosecutors, private sector employers, and other relevant audiences to continue implementing the global repatriation of DPRK workers.
  • The DPRK is exporting and importing sanctioned commodities in violation of UNSCR sanctions: The DPRK is exploiting inconsistent implementation of international sanctions to continue its trade in UNSC-prohibited commodities, including the sale of such goods as coal, seafood, and military equipment and the importation of products such as refined petroleum (in excess of UN-imposed limits) and luxury goods. ISN/CTR seeks effective and innovative proposals designed to halt the DPRK’s illicit trade of commodities.
  • DPRK nationals, including diplomats, travel abroad and engage in commerce to generate revenue for the regime and its WMD and missile programs in violation of UNSCRs: DPRK nationals engage in UN and U.S.-sanctioned commercial activities to generate revenue for the regime and its key domestic constituencies. This includes DPRK diplomats who use the diplomatic pouch to smuggle illicit goods including, but not limited to, drugs, weapons, cash, luxury items (including gold and cigarettes), and exotic animal parts. ISN/CTR seeks innovative programmatic solutions to halt these activities.
• Open-Source Research
  • Open-source information on continually evolving sanctions evasion is key to informing ISN/CTR programming: The DPRK employs an evolving network of witting and unwitting individuals, corporate entities, maritime vessels, and diplomatic missions to conduct and conceal its sanctions evasion activities. ISN/CTR seeks to produce reporting based on rigorous collection and analysis of open source and commercially available information for the purpose of informing the targeted capacity building efforts and providing unclassified information to foreign governments to make them aware of, and assist their investigations into, DPRK sanctions-evasion activity.

Funding Information

• Length of performance period: Twelve (12) months
• Number of awards anticipated: 25 awards (dependent on amounts)
• Award amounts: awards may range from a minimum of $50,000 to a maximum of $250,000
• Total available funding: $12,000,000
• Anticipated program start date: October 1, 2024
• Program Performance Period: Proposed programs should be completed in 12 months or less.

Eligibility Criteria

• Eligible Applicants
  • The following organizations are eligible to apply:
    • Not-for-profit organizations, including think tanks and civil society/non-governmental organizations
    • Public and private educational institutions
    • Federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs)
    • For-profit organizations Public International Organizations and
    • Governmental institutions
• Cost Sharing or Matching
  • Cost sharing is not required and will play no role in when the project is being evaluated.

For more information, visit Grants.gov.