The Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), part of the Department’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), sponsors foreign assistance activities funded by the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account, and focuses on mitigating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons proliferation and security threats from proliferator states and non-state actors.
- ISN/CTR’s Chemical Security Program (CSP) works with foreign partners’ law enforcement, government, academic, industrial, and technical scientific communities to strengthen their ability to prevent, detect, mitigate, and respond to chemical attacks, the malign proliferation and use of weaponizable chemicals, and advances in vertical chemical weapons (CW) proliferation by states in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as the program’s top priority, as well as chemical attacks by non-state actors as an area of decreased emphasis in FY23. As proliferator state and non-state actor use of CW continues to evolve, CSP uses its programmatic global resources to adapt rapidly.
- States pursuing, creating, or proliferating CW capabilities take advantage of weaknesses in the chemical supply chain to procure CW-related equipment, technology, and precursors—including pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and custom-made chemicals from contract chemical manufacturers on the global market. The governments of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and of Iran seek to advance in, inter alia, the research of PBAs and toxins with potential dual-use applications and by exploiting foreign academic and commercial research collaborations, including the exploitation of Ukrainian chemists displaced by the Russian invasion. The PRC in particular exploits foreign research partners, while scientists at Chinese military medical institutions are engaged in research involving the synthesis, characterization, and testing of PBAs with potential dual-use applications.
- Identify and disrupt, at any point in the chemical supply chain, the acquisition networks of weaponizable precursors, equipment, and expertise procured by state proliferators and nonstate actors intending to violate international norms pertaining to the use of CW.
- Strengthen CW identification and attack investigations to attribute a CW attack to the appropriate state or non-state actor.
- Enhance the ability of foreign partners to prevent and mitigate non-state actor chemical attacks, including from toxic gasses made from commercially available material.
- Leveraging open-source commercial data to provide clear case studies and red flags for nonstate and state procurement networks.
- Length of performance period: 12 Months
- Number of awards anticipated: 20-50 awards (dependent on amounts)
- Award amounts: awards may range from a minimum of $50,000 to a maximum of $250,000
- Total available funding: $5,845,000
Participants and Audiences
CSP stakeholders include:
- Industries and laboratories that manufacture, store, or distribute weaponizable chemicals, their precursors, and production equipment, such as the pharmaceutical and contract chemical sectors;
- Suppliers and vendors of chemical precursors, weaponizable chemicals, and related production equipment;
- Law enforcement entities and security forces, including those responsible for securing public transportation, mass gatherings, and other potential targets of a chemical attack or responding to such attack if one occurs;
- Government ministries and agencies that have a role in chemical oversight and response, including regulatory authorities and emergency management agencies;
- Facility and laboratory security officials who oversee securing chemicals and related equipment, as well as laboratory staff responsible for analyzing the use of chemicals;
- Chemical faculties and departments within universities and research institutions;
- Scientists, technicians, and engineers in academia, state research institutes, and the private sector who may be unwitting contributors to vertical proliferation through their research collaborations with partners acting on behalf of state CW proliferators; and,
- Academic and industry associations that may play a role in the promotion of chemical security best practices.
CSP encourages proposal submissions that address specific vulnerabilities associated with the threat environments in each of the countries listed below. Some CSP priority countries can benefit from programmatic efforts highlighted within multiple categories. In addressing the PRC’s pursuit of CW, CSP expects to emphasize programming with established partner states in Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe and with South Africa, India, Brazil, and Chile. Programming to disrupt the Iranian regime’s pursuit of CW will focus in Egypt, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Malaysia, India, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Efforts to address the Assad regime’s CW program will partner principally with institutions in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and the UAE. Assistance in preventing non-state actor CW pursuits will seek to focus primarily on Turkey, the Central Asian republics Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and separately on persistent terrorism threats in Somalia, Nigeria, and the Philippines.
The following organizations are eligible to apply (both domestic and international):
- Not-for-profit organizations
- Public and private educational institutions
- For-profit organizations
- Federally funded research and development centers
- Public International Organizations
For more information, visit https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/view-opportunity.html?oppId=344295