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NOFO: Countering Proliferator State Advanced Conventional Weapons Proliferation

Deadline: 17-Jan-2025

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction is pleased to invite submissions for its Countering Proliferator State Advanced Conventional Weapons Proliferation initiative.

ISN/CTR seeks to build foreign partner capacity to counter the malign impact of proliferator states’ Advanced Conventional Weapons (ACW) sales, procurement, and proliferation networks. Proliferator states often use the sale of weapons systems to exert malign influence, exacerbate regional conflicts, and develop long-term strategic defense dependencies. There is also a growing trend proliferator states creating “no-limit” partnerships to circumvent sanctions regimes and provide weapons to nefarious state and non-state threat actors.

Proliferator states also seek to procure significant quantities of advanced machine tools, micro-electronics, and other high-tech commodities from the global market to support their own defense industrial bases. In an effort to access ACW technologies and resources, proliferator states are increasingly involved in exploitative joint ventures and other predatory defense trade practices. There is also growing evidence on the rapid expansion of proliferator state investment in defense manufacturing – especially in the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) field. These defense systems can then be sold to malign threat actors, which result in destabilized regions, prolonged conflicts, as well as strategic defense dependencies.

To complement these malign activities, there is a continuing trend to utilize Private Military Companies, especially on the African continent, to extend proliferator state security, economic, and political influence in countries that are facing legitimate security concerns. These unregulated mercenary security entities often operate contrary to international norms and country laws. These entities are also used to exert malign influence, undermine national security, destabilize regions, and exploit critical natural resources.

Goal
  • Engage foreign audiences on countering threats posed by the advancement of proliferator state weapons capabilities, the sale of ACW systems to create strategic dependencies, and the destabilizing impact of unregulated Private Military Companies. Projects should be sustainable and build relationships between partners.
Objectives
  • Private Military Companies (PMCs): ISN/CTR’s foreign capacity building efforts will engage a range of stakeholders including government policy officials, procurement officials, financial watchdogs, military and law enforcement officials, civil society, and journalists to raise awareness of the risks of working with unregulated and prohibited PMCs. These engagements will seek to leverage real world case studies to highlight the destabilizing impact of these mercenary groups, and the threat to sovereignty and national security.
  • ACW: Mitigating Proliferator State Procurement Networks: Some proliferator states still leverage complex procurement networks to procure billions of U.S. dollar’s worth of Western technologies for defense proliferation. Specifically, commercial trade data highlights particular proliferator state interest in the fields of microelectronics, semiconductors, and machine tools. The implementation of unprecedented bilateral and multilateral sanctions regimes have forced proliferator states to adapt illicit procurement networks and pivot into new or more permissive jurisdictions.
  • ACW: Countering State-Based Proliferation of ACW: Proliferator states increasingly use the sale of their advanced conventional weapons systems as a means to obtain financial resources, exert malign influence, and create strategic defense dependencies. There is a growing trend of the “no-limit” partnerships among proliferator states selling weapon systems to unstable jurisdictions, and as a means to circumvent international sanctions regimes.
  • ACW: Addressing Strategic Defense Dependencies: When foreign governments procure weapons systems from proliferator states through predatory agreements, it forces the recipient country into a long-term contract and defense dependencies. This undermines the recipient’s ability to make independent defense choices and limits their national security, while expanding malign influence of the proliferator state.
Funding Information
  • Total Funding Ceiling: $17,000,000
  • Award Ceiling: $5,000,000
  • Award Floor: $50,000
  • Anticipated number of awards: 12
  • Duration: 15 months
Expected Outcomes
  • All proposals will measure partner capacity before and after training and engagement, with the expectation that skills, procedures, and abilities have increased due to ISN/CTR support.
Eligible Countries
  • Private Military Companies (PMCs): Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Kosovo, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Ukraine, and Zambia.
  • ACW: Mitigating Proliferator State Procurement Networks: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cayman Islands, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechia, Ecuador, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Moldova, North Macedonia, Qatar, Romania, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Seychelles, Slovakia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan.
  • ACW: Countering State-Based Proliferation of ACW: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Czechia, Hungary, India, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Panama, Peru, Poland, Serbia, Türkiye, and UAE.
  • ACW: Addressing Strategic Defense Dependencies: Argentina, Armenia, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Gabon, Ghana, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Serbia, and Vietnam.
Eligibility Criteria
  • U.S.-based non-profit/non-governmental organizations with or without 501(c) (3) status of the U.S. tax code; foreign-based nonprofit organizations/non-government organizations (NGO); federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs); public International Organizations; Foreign Public Entities; U.S.-based private, public, or state institutions of higher education; foreign-based institutions of higher education, and U.S. for-profit organizations or businesses.
Application Requirements
  • For all application documents, please ensure:
    • All documents are in English, and all costs are in U.S. dollars. If an original document within the application is in another language, an English translation must be provided. If any document is provided in both English and a foreign language, the English language version is the controlling version;
    • All pages are numbered, including budgets and attachments;
    • All documents are formatted to 8 ½ x 11 paper; and,
    • All documents are single-spaced, 14-point Calibri font, with 1-inch margins. Captions and footnotes may be 10-point Calibri font. Font sizes in charts and tables, including the budget, can be reformatted to fit within 1 page width.
    • All application materials must be submitted through the online portal unless you are a U.S. Government entity applying for Inter-Agency Agreement (IAA) funding.

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